But this objection may be raised : Is not justice the ideal which absolutely cannot be surpassed?

In fact always and for all stages of social evolution, the human idea of justice expresses the highest synthesis of appreciative judgments. But cannot these judgments themselves always be extended to a larger circle of relations? And does it not therefore follow that their general and abstract expression can never be regarded as complete?

 

The absolute value of morality, then, signifies nothing but a larger relativity. Such a conclusion is imposed upon whoever scientifically conceives morality as a fact, regardless of all possible considerations of advantage or disadvantage which could be connected with this result. But the dreaded danger of evil result does not exist for him who keeps before his eyes the preeminence of general ethical ideals over the motives of individual actions. For this is the only thing of practical importance expressed by such an absolute. Meanwhile the statement that morality is relative, tends in itself to raise the standards of our judgments and conduct, above all in the relations of different peoples, in different conditions of life.

 

Nothing is more unjust than to extend the canons of our morality to men unlike ourselves; and the absurd pretense of imposing our rules upon them in the name of a natural superiority, ought simply to make a philosopher laugh, if the practical consequences did not suggest sadder reflections to his mind.